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Interest Representation and the Federal Land Policy 
and Management Act 
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 19761 
(FLPMA) effected a fundamental change in the legal premises un-
derlying ownership of the public lands and overhauled Federal land 
management policy. The theoretical premise underlying govern-
mental ownership of these lands had traditionally been that they 
were held pending disposition to private interests. 2 In contrast to 
this premise, the FLPMA proclaimed that these lands are to be held 
in perpetuity by the federal government and managed to serve the 
diverse needs of the American public.3 Although Congress was con-
cerned that previous acts had afforded the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment (BLM) too much discretion,4 it was able in the FLPMA to 
provide only the most general guidelines for balancing those needs.5 
To ensure that the BLM fairly resolved the conflicts among users of 
the public lands, however, Congress called for widespread public 
participation in the agency's planning and management activities.6 
I. Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 and scattered 
sections of 7, 10, 16, 22, 25, 30, 40, 48, 49 U.S.C. (1976)) [hereinafter referred to as FLPMA]. 
2. See, e.g., Homestead Act of 1862, 43 U.S.C. §§ 161-175 (1976) (repealed in 1976 by 
FLPMA); Desert Lands Act of 1877, 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-329 (1976); Kinkaid Act of 1904, 43 
U.S.C. § 224 (1976) (repealed in 1976 by FLPMA); Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916, 43 
U.S.C. §§ 291-301 (1976) (repealed in 1976 by FLPMA). For a brief historical survey of the 
development of these land disposition acts and others, see G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, 
FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND R.EsOURCES LAW 65-74 (1981). 
3. The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States that - (1) the public 
lands be retained in Federal ownership, unless as a result of the land use planning proce-
dure provided for in this Act, it is determined that disposal of a particular parcel will serve 
the national interest . • . . 
43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(l) (1976). . 
4. See 43 U.S.C. § 170l(a)(5) (1976); 122 CONG. REc. 23,435 (remarks of Rep. Melcher) 
(''The executive branch has tended to fill in missing gaps in the law. This has not always been 
done in a manner consistent with a system balanced in the best interest of all the people"). An 
· example of congressional intent to reassert control over the land management process may be 
seen in FLPMA's repeal of the doctrine of executive withdrawals. The courts had developed a 
concept of "implied" executive authority over the public lands. United States v. Midwest Oil, 
236 U.S. 459 (1915);see Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 594-601 (1963) (applying Midwest 
Oil to validate executive withdrawals for Indian reservations). However, FLPMA explicitly 
repeals, prospectively, Midwest Oil and the doctrine of "implied" executive withdrawal pow-
ers. FLPMA, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704, 90 Stat. 2792 (1976). While this may be an "inartful 
repealer" with doubt remaining as to its success, G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 2, 
at 206, it clearly is indicative of Congress' intent to reassert its constitutional control over the 
land management process. So understood, it has important implications for judicial review 
generally of such actions, regardless of its success as an effective repealer of Midwest Oil and 
its progeny. 
5. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(7}-(8), 1713(c) (1976); text at notes 36-45 infra. 
6. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(5), 1712(a), 1739(e) (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1163, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 6175, 6181: 
1303 
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Because Congress did not precisely define the timing, nature, or 
scope of the public participation that it authorized, the BLM and the 
courts must attempt to give content to its vague mandate. The role 
of the BLM under the FLPMA, this Note argues, is accurately cap-
tured in the "interest representation" model of administrative law;7 
judicial review under this model serves to vindicate the "participa-
tion rights" of parties interested in public lands management. 8 Part I 
places the FLPMA in the context of other recent congressional re-
form efforts and attempts to justify heightened judicial scrutiny of 
the BLM's activities. To protect citizens' participation rights, it con-
cludes, courts should recognize a limited right to initiate the plan-
ning and management provisions of the FLPMA. The Act, in other 
words, should be interpreted to comprehend "agenda forcing" by the 
public. Part II uses the persistent problem of conflicts among recrea-
tional users of public lands to illustrate the need for "agenda-forc-
ing" action by citizens to effectuate congressional intent.9 
I. PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT, JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND AGENDA 
FORCING 
In a number of respects, the system of .administrative law inher-
ited from the New Deal has been significantly transformed during 
the past two decades.10 Underlying that traditional system, which 
In subsection (g) the Secretary is directed to allow public involvement and to establish 
procedures for Federal, State, and local government and public participation in develop-
ment of public land use plans and programs. In requiring "public participation" the 
Committee does not intend any dimunition [sic] in the authority and responsibility of the 
Secretaries to make public land and National Forest decisions. It does expect the Secre-
taries to provide means for input by the interested public before decisions are made. The 
Secretaries will be expected to respond to public opinion but are expected to make their 
decisions on the ments of each case and not on counting the numoers of responses pro 
and con. As to the extent of public participation in each case a rule of reason will be 
applied so that the cost of input procedures does not exceed the values involved. How-
ever, some expenditures will always be justified to insure public exposure of pro.posed 
decisions, even though the public may not in all cases respond to the opporturuty to 
comment 
Id See generally, Achterman & Fairfax, Tlze Public Participation RetJUirements of tlte Federal 
Land Polky and Management Act, 21 ARiz. L. REv. 501 (1979). 
1. See Stewart, Tlze Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. RBv. 1667, 
1723-90 (1975); Verkuil, Tlze Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. 
RBv. 258, 303-11 (1978). 
8. Stewart, Sllpra note 7, at 1750; see Achterman & Fairfax, Sllpra note 6, at 515. 
9. The problem of recreational conflicts is used for illustrative purposes only. "Agenda 
forcing," this Note argues, is required to carry out congressional intent in the FLPMA wher-
ever use conflicts on the public lands are not being addressed by the BLM or where the BLM is 
allocating use of the public lands without using FLPMA's procedures. See Mountain States 
Legal Foun. v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383 (D. Wyo. 1980) (Court finds Secretary's delay in 
acting on outstanding oil and gas lease applications to be de facto withdrawal of the subject 
lands from the operation of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 in contravention of FLPMA's 
procedures and orders the Secretary either to issue the leases forthwith or to pursue the formal 
withdrawal mechanism contained in FLPMA). 
10. See generally Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. RBv. 
393 (1981); Stewart, S11pra note 7. 
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was typified by broad and unstructured delegations of authority 
from Congress to administrative agencies, 11 were ''three distinct, if 
interrelated, elements."12 Most fundamentally, the system was 
founded on a belief in the need for expert solutions to pressing social 
problems. 13 To facilitate the application of agencies' expertise to 
these problems, administrative agencies established under the New 
Deal model were insulated from the control of Congress and the Ex-
ecutive Branch.14 And to ensure that courts did not attempt to sub-
stitute their judgment for the judgment of agency experts, judicial 
review of agency decisions was limited to review of their procedural 
propriety.15 
It is unclear whether the New Deal's "affirmation of expertise" 
was ever warranted, but we do know that "[b]y the late 1960s, a 
generation's experience had eroded New Deal confidence in expert 
policymaking."16 As a result, proposals to reform administrative 
agencies, particularly those whose mission included protecting the 
environment, 17 proliferated. 18 On a number of occasions, Congress 
responded to the demands for reform with "action-forcing" or 
"agency-forcing" statutes, 19 which were designed to remove "an is-
sue from the general run of agency discretion and ... [to guide] 
policy in a particular direction."20 In other cases, the pressure for 
11. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1676-77 ("However, rather than being the exception, fed-
eral legislation establishing agency charters has, over the past several decades, often been strik-
ingly broad and nonspecific, and has accordingly generated the very conditions which the 
traditional model was designed to eliminate." (footnotes omitted)). 
12. B. ACKERMAN & w. HAsSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 4 (1981); see J. FREEDMAN, 
CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 32, 44-46, 59-61 (1978); J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 
23-24, 68-70 (1938); Stewart, supra note 7, at 1676-81. 
13. B. ACKERMAN & W. HAssLER, supra note 12, at 4-5; see J. LANDIS, supra note 12, at 
10-16, 46-50, 67-70; Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L. 
REv. 1041, 1057 n.74 (1975). 
14. B. ACKERMAN & W. HAssLER, supra note 12, at 5-6; see J. LANDIS supra note 12, at 70-
72. 
15. B. ACKERMAN & W. HAssLER, supra note 12, at 6; see FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting 
Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138-45 (1940); S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REG-
ULATORY POLICY 288-90 (1979); J. FREEDMAN, supra note 12, at 45-46; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL 
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965). 
16. B. ACKERMAN & W. HAsSLER, supra note 12, at 7. See generally L. KOHLMEIER, THE 
REGULATORS 73 (1969); T. LOWI, THE END OF LmERALISM 72-93 (1969); PREsIDENTS ADVI-
SORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (1971); J. 
SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 52-56, 60-62 (1970). 
17. B. ACKERMAN & w. HAsSLER, supra note 12, at 8; s. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra 
note 15, at 283-85. • 
18. B. ACKERMAN & w. HAsSLER, supra note 12, at 8; see H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 13-14, 142-47 (1962). 
19. B. ACKERMAN & W. HAssLER, supra note 12, at 104; R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 371-73 (2d ed. 1978); Diver, supra note 10, at 409; Henderson & 
Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The Limits of Aspirational Commandr, 
78 CoLUM L. REv. 1429, 1442-45, 1468 (1978). 
20. B. ACKERMAN & W. HAssLER, supra note 12, at 104. 
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reform led Congress to democratize administrative law by providing 
expanded opportunities for public participation in agencies' deci-
sionmaking processes.21 These congressional experiments have pro-
foundly affected the roles of both the agencies and the courts in the 
1 formulation and implementation of public policy. 
In particular, these reforms, together with the "hard look doc-
trine" that characterizes modern judicial review of agency policy-
making, 22 signal an expanded role for the judiciary in the adminis-
trative process. Agency-forcing statutes, for example, "should be 
read in the light of the principle of full inquiry - requiring the fullest 
possible agency investigation into competing policy approaches con-
sistent with the text of the agency-forcing statute.23 While these stat-
utes do not authorize courts to ''take primary responsibility for the 
development of substantive policy," the scope of judicial review 
must be sufficient "to assure a full and focused airing to plausible 
policy options before officials make decisions of consequence."24 
Similarly, the faith that Congress has recently placed in public par-
ticipation has led to the development of an "interest representation 
model" of administrative law, which calls for judicial review to en-
sure, not the substantive merits of agency 4ecisions, but the fair rep-
resentation of all of the interests affected by an agency's decision.25 
These expanded notions of judicial review of agency decisions, of 
course, should be reexamined in light of the Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Cop. v. Natural Re-
sources .Defense Council Inc. 26 The Vermont Yankee Court denied 
federal courts the authority, except in unusual cases, to impose pro-
cedural obligations on agencies beyond those established by the Ad-
21. Achterman & Fairfax, supra note 6, at 504-16; cf. Gellhom, Public Parlicipalion in Ad-
minis/ralive Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359 (1972) (discussing judicial expansion of public 
participation). 
22. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 832-33 
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(court should "intervene" in an agency decision "if the court becomes aware, especially from a 
combination of danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a 'hard look' at the salient 
problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making" (footnote omitted)); 
Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in /he Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 HARV. L. 
REv. 1833, 1834 (1978); Diver, supra note IO, at 411-12 (''More exacting judicial review of 
substantive agency decisions accompanied greater procedural formality. The very label used 
to describe modem judicial review of policymaking - the 'hard look doctrine' - captures the 
spirit of this transformation. Reviewing courts are no longer willing to affirm based on the 
intuitive plausibility of the link between the policy announced and the statutory standard." 
(footnotes omitted)); Leventhal, Environmental J)ecisionmaking and /he Role of the Courts, 122 
U. PA. L. REv. 509 (1974); Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Proce-
dure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1804, 1811 (1978). 
23. B. ACKERMAN & W. HAssLER, supra note 12, at 105 (footnotes omitted). 
24. Id at 115. 
25. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1688, 1712, 1760-90; Verkuil, supra note 7, at 303-11. 
26. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
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ministrative Procedure Act (APA).27 The decision "leaves 
untouched'' the hard look doctrine,28 but to the extent that the prin-
ciple of full inquiry and the interest representation model call upon 
courts to impose innovative procedures on agencies, the theories' vi-
ability has been impaired by the Court's opinion. In fact, the Court's 
decision may have been motivated, in large part, by its discomfort 
with lower court decisions that have attempted to democratize the 
administrative policymaking process.29 Vermont Yankee, when read 
together with recent decisions limiting the availability of the "aggres-
sively participatory''30 implied right of action,31 may thus evince the 
Court's "quarrel" with the participatory model,32 at least where 
broadened participation is not expressly authorized by Congress. 
But if Congress statutorily embraces a participatory model that tran-
scends the AP A, application of Vermont Yankee would seem inappo-
site. The public participation provisions of some recent enactments 
have clearly gone beyond those of the AP A. Where the broadened 
participation rights are clearly delineated, courts need do no more 
than enforce those rights; where Congress expresses an intent to in-
volve the public more fully in the administrative process but does 
not address the timing, manner, or scope of that increased participa-
tion, however, courts should be permitted to play a more active role 
in giving content to those participation rights. Such an approach is 
consistent with congressional intent and does not violate the man-
date of Vermont Yankee. 
Congress' recent attempts to guide the management of public 
lands have gone beyond the requirements of the AP A, and the 
changes that have affected administrative law generally are strik-
ingly apparent in this area. Until recently, the agencies charged with 
managing public lands were granted virtually untrammeled discre-
tion by Congress.33 They were heirs, moreover, to a tradition of ex-
27. 435 U.S. at 548. 
28. Diver, supra note 10, at 423. See also McGarity, Substantive and Procedural .Discretion 
in .Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and 
OSHA, 67 GEO. LJ. 729, 752 (1979) ("Although the Court in Vermont Yankee did not directly 
address the role of the courts in substantively reviewing agency decisions, it did resolve a 
longstanding dispute between the two dominant schools of thought on that question. The 
Court rejected Judge Bazelon's 'good procedures ensure good substance' approach and implic-
itly favored Judge Leventhal's more activist 'hard look' approach. Whether the Court will 
explicitly adopt the hard look approach remains to be seen." (footnotes omitted.)). 
29. Diver, supra note 10, at 423. 
30. Id at 425. 
31. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 292-93 (1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advi-
sors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); 
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316-17 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See 
generally Note, Implying a Cause of .Action Under Section .503 of the Rehabilitation .Act of 1973, 
79 MICH. L. REV. 1093-96 (1981). 
32. Diver, supra note 10, at 423. 
33. A number of commentators pronounced the statutes so vague as to foreclose the devel-
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treme judicial deference.34 In the early 1970's, it became apparent 
that the· public lands were being ineffectively managed and that 
some limits on the discretion of the Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) were necessary.35 With the passage of the FLPMA in 1976, 
therefore, "Congress intended . . . to reassert control over the use of 
federal lands."36 The Act not only attempted to establish substantive 
opment of any standards applicable to particular cases. See G. ROBINSON, THE FOREST SERV-
ICE 55-59 (1975); Loesch, Multiple Uses of Public Lands - Accommodation or Choosing 
Between Co,y/icling Uses, 16 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1, 12-15, 19-20, 24-31 (1971); Miller, 
Judicial Control of Forest Service .Discretion Under the Multiple-Use Act, 5 ENVTL. L. 127, 131-
37 (1974); Strand, Statutory Authority Governing Management of the National Fores/ System -
Time For A Change?, 1 NAT. REsoURCES LAW. 487-93 (1974); Comment, The Multiple Use-
Sustained Yield Act: A .Decade of Consideration, 10 IDAHO L. REv. 105, 114-16 (1973); Note, 
Managing Federal Lands: Replacing the Multiple Use System, 82 YALE L.J. 787 (1973); Sympo-
sium on Forest Policy, 8 ENVTL. L. 239 (1978). 
34. In fact, it could be argued that there was simply no tradition of judicial review of 
public lands management decisions. See G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 226-
27 (1981). Although management of the public lands is constitutionally committed to Con-
gress, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; U.S. CONST, art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; Kleppe v. New Mexico, 
426 U.S. 529 (1976); G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 144-47, executive powers 
in the area are delegated, see 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(4) (1976) (overturning United States v. Mid-
west Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915), and the doctrine of"implied" executive withdrawal powers), 
and courts have been extremely deferential to administrative decisions. They have used the 
full panoply of barriers to judicial review - standing, ripeness, primary jurisdiction, 
nonreviewability, and scope of review - in refusing to review the implementation of this 
delegated power. For a full discussion of judicial use of these various techniques in the public 
lands context, see Comment, The Conservationists and the Public Lands: Administrative and 
· Judicial Remedies Relating lo the Use and .Disposition of the Public Lands Administered by the 
.Department of Interior, 68 MlcH. L. REv. 1200, 1218-53 (1970). For cases applying these and 
other avoidance techniques, see Nelson v. Andrus, 591 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1978); Strickland v. 
Morton, 519 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1975) (applying 5 U.S.C. § 70l(a) (1976), and concluding that 
congressional mandate was so vague as to pre~ude judicial development of standards); Ness 
Inv. Corp. v. Department of Agriculture, 512 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1975) (applying 5 U.S.C. 
§ 701(a) (1976)); Wilkinson, The Field of Public Land Law: Some Connecting Threads and 
Future .Directions, 1 PuB. LAND L. REv. 1, 23 & n.157 (1980) (extensive citation of administra-
tive review cases supporting proposition that courts, in reviewing public land management 
decisions, engage in "Deferential Review'' within APA framework). 
35. Dissatisfaction with the management of the public lands culminated in formation of 
the Public Land Law Review Commission. Act of Sept. 19, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-606, 78 Stat. 
982 (1964). Its report, PuBuc LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONB THIRD OF THB NATION'S 
LAND (1970), recommended substantial changes in the management of the public lands, see, 
eg., id. at 1-16, and was the first step towards the drafting and passage of FLPMA. For an 
analysis of the relationship of the Public Land Law Review Commission's work and FLPMA, 
see Muys, The Public Land Law Review Commission's Impact on the Federal Land Management 
and Policy Act of 1976, 21 ARiz. L. REv. 301 (1979). 
36. Mountain States Legal Foun. v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383, 395 (D. Wyo. 1980). The 
FLPMA declares that it is the policy of the United States that "the Congress exercise its consti-
tutional authority to withdraw or otherwise designate or dedicate Federal lands for specified 
purposes and that Congress delineate the extent to which the Executive may withdraw lands 
without legislative action." 43 U.S.C. § 170l(a)(4) (1976). This provision was intended to re• 
peal the ''implied" authority of the President to make withdrawals. H.R. REP. No. 1163, supra 
note 6, at 29, [1976] U.S. CoDB CONG. & Ao. NBWS at 6203. FLPMA also changed traditional 
understanding of the meaning of ''withdrawal." Until FLPMA, it was generally understood as 
referring to the removal of lands from the operation of the public land disposition statutes. 
PuBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, STUDY OF WITHDRAWALS AND REsBRVATIONS OF 
PuBuc DOMAIN LANDS 1 (1969). FLPMA includes this concept but adds an alternative mean-
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guidelines for administrative decision-making,37 but also provided 
for greatly expanded public participation in the management pro-
cess38 and for 'judicial review of public land adjudication deci-
sions."39 Unfortunately, Congress did not take care to delineate 
precisely the scope and nature of the public participation or judicial 
review that it authorized, and these must necessarily be inferred 
from circumstantial evidence. 
While the FLPMA appears, on its face, to contain both agency-
forcing and interest representation elements, the interest representa-
tion elements predominate on closer examination. From a manage-
ment standpoint, perhaps the most important task assigned the BLM 
under the Act is the formulation of land use plans. Congress has, to 
be sure, attempted to prescribe a systematic methodology and proce-
dure for the development of such plans in section 202.40 But the 
"Criteria for Development and Revision" specified in section 202( c) 
are so open-ended as to afford the agency almost total discretion. 
It is difficult, for example, to find any significant limitation on the 
BLM's discretion in the "multiple use, sustained yield" principle that 
serves as Congress' primary directive to the agency.41 This principle 
ing as "reserving the area for a particular public purpose or program." 43 U.S.C. § 1702(i) 
(1976). The Interior Department objected vigorously to this change in the definition: 
The definition in Section 103(i) of this bill [43 U.S.C. § 1702(i)] would plunge the law 
back into the chaotic situation at the turn of the century when no one knew exactly what a 
withdrawal meant. It would call everything from a land use plan, through a formal 
designation of use, to a traditional withdrawal, a ''withdrawal" This bears little or no 
relationship to the traditional concept of withdrawal to any Secretarial decision that a 
particular parcel of land should be used primarily for one purpose. This proposed defini-
tion represents a completely new concept, and if it is called a ''withdrawal", it will only 
engender further confusion. 
H.R. REP. No. 1163, supra note 6, at 44, [1976] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & Ao. NEWS at 6218 (com-
ments of the Interior Department on H.B. 13,777). 
Withdrawals are now, apparently, defined so that they encompass "management deci-
sions," 43 U.S.C. § 1712(e) (1976), by which the Secretary implements land use plans. H.R. 
REP. No. 1163, supra note 6, at 45, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6175 (comments 
of the Interior Department on H.B. 13,777). 
The very careful circumscription of this authority by Congress, see 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712(e)(2), 
1714 (1976), represents its attempt to reassert control of the land management process and to 
limit the heretofore broad discretion granted the land management agencies in this regard. 
This change was made because 
[t]he Executive Branch of the Government has tended to fill in missing gaps in the law, 
not always in a manner consistent with a system balanced in the best interests of all the 
people. A major weakness which has arisen under these circumstances is instability of 
national policies. 
H.R. REP. No. 1163, supra note 6, at 1, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6175. 
31. See 43 U.S.C § 1712(c) (1976). 
38. See 43 U.S.C §§ 170l(a)(5), 1712(a), 1739(e) (1976). 
39. 43 U.S.C. § 170l(a)(6) (1976). 
40. 43 u.s.c. § 1712 (1976). 
41. See 43 U.S.C. § 170l(a)(7) (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1163,supra note 6, at3-4, [1976] U.S. 
CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6177-78. ''Multiple use" is defined as follows: 
The term "multiple use" means the management of the public lands and their various 
resources values so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the present 
and future needs of the American people; making the most judicious use of the land for 
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had its statutory origin in the Multiple-Use and Sustained-Yield Act 
of 1960,42 and its efficacy as a guide for administrative policy and a 
workable check on agency discretion has been questioned by courts 
and commentators ever since.43 Even in the face of egregious "single 
use" management of the Tongass National Forest, one court was un-
able to find any judicially enforceable llmits on discretion in the 
"multiple use" mandate: 
The standards Congress has used to delegate authority over the forests 
are so general, so sweeping, and so vague as to represent a turnover of 
virtually all responsibility. "Multiple use" does establish that the for-
ests cannot be used exclusively for one purpose, but beyond this it is 
little more than a phrase expressing the hope that all competing inter-
ests can somehow be satisfied and leaving the real decision to others.44 
Despite the unkind treatment that the concept had received, the leg-
islative history of the FLPMA reveals that Congress intended noth-
ing new, it accepted and adopted the "multiple use" principle as it 
had been developed by previous statutes and interpreted by the 
courts.45 That Congress adopted this standard in an act designed to 
reassert its control over public lands management may suggest that 
Congress believes the phrase has some discernible meaning, but 
neither the statutory language nor the legislative history offers clear 
guidance to the BLM or the courts. 
Without congressional guidance on substantive issues, the type of 
some or all of these resources or related services over areas large enough to provide suffi-
cient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to changing needs and condi-
tions; the use of some land for less than all of the resources uses that takes into account the 
long-term needs of future generations for renewable and nomenewable resources, includ-
ing, but not limited to, recreation, range timber, minerals, watershed, and historical val-
ues; and harmonious and coordinated management of the various resources without 
permanent impairment of the productivity of the land and the quality of the environment 
with consideration being given to the relative values of the resources and not necessarily 
to the combination of uses that will give the greatest economic return of the greatest urut 
output. 
43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (1976) (emphasis added). 
42. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1976). For a detailed analysis of this act, see Comment, supra 
note 33. 
43. See, e.g., Behan, The Succotash Syndrome, or Multiple Use: A Heartfelt Approach lo 
Forest Land Management, 7 NAT. REsOURCES J. 473 (1967); authorities cited in Achterman & 
Fairfax, supra note 6, at 509 n.37; authorities cited in note 33 supra. 
44. Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 123 n.48 (D. Alaska 1971) (quoting REICH, 
BUREAUCRACY AND THE FORESTS 3 (1962)), remanded for consideration of new evidence, Sierra 
Club v. Butz, 3 ENVTL. L. REP. 20,292 (9th Cir. 1973). There was no further litigation after the 
remand because the timber company abandoned the challenged contract. See also G. Coo-
GINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 490. On the lack of standards in the FLPMA gener-
ally, see Achterman & Fairfax, supra note 6, at 503, 509, 517. These authors conclude that 
[t]he statutory mandate ofFLPMA is so broad that the balance of uses on the public lands 
is left almost wholly to the BLM's discretion. Public land management issues are so con-
troversial that Congress refused to make judgments about them. Instead, it turned to the 
procedural requirements epitomized by the public involvement requirements of FLPMA. 
Id at 517. 
45. H.R. REP. No. 1163, supra note 6, at 4-5, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG, & AD. NEWS at 
6177-78. 
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judicial review suggested by the agency-forcing model is unlikely to 
be effective and may, in fact, hinder administrative policymaking. 
Courts could attempt to enforce the requirements of section 202, but 
the need to define those requirements could result in rather intrusive 
judicial review. In the absence of a clear statement of congressional 
intent, courts adopting the broad scope of review suggested by the 
agency-forcing model may be tempted to substitute their own views 
on the goals of public lands management and their own interpreta-
tions of the requirements of section 202 for those of the BLM. On 
the basis of the FLPMA's substantive provisions, therefore, it is diffi-
cult to justify an expanded role for the courts ''without presuming a 
policymaking competence that outstrips judicial capacities."46 
Although the FLPMA's weak agency-forcing provisions do not 
justify expanding the scope of judicial review, the Act's lack of clear 
standards and its broad public participation provisions suggest that 
courts should apply the interest representation model when review-
ing action of the BLM.47 As articulated by Professors Breyer and 
Stewart, the 
interest representation model attempts to promote the equitable exer-
cise of agency discretion by assuring interested groups and parties the 
right to participate in formal agency decision making. It acknowledges 
the "legislative" character of agency choice, and attempts to develop 
formal, legalistic modes of representation as a surrogate for the polit-
ical mechanisms of representation applicable to legislatures. In so do-
ing, the interest representative model tends to highlight the multiple 
trade offs among values and interests that are at the heart of many 
administrative decisions. 48 
Underlying this model is an assumption that "an enlarged system of 
formal proceedings can, by securing adequate consideration of the 
interests of all affected persons, yield outcomes that better serve soci-
ety as a whole."49 The validity of this assumption has been seriously 
questioned, so but :i,Il the FLPMA, as in other areas, one sees evidence 
46. B. ACKERMAN & W. HAssLER, supra note 12, at 104. 
47. If the BLM fails to take advantage of this opportunity [to define participation stan-
dards], it is likely to confront the application by the courts of an interest representation 
standard of review. In FLPMA, as rarely before, such a standard would be appropriate. 
Land use planning, the underlying basis for virtually all other decisions, poses the unique 
mix of legislative and judicial functions to which this new standard of review is most 
applicable. The courts should focus both on whether the administrative record shows that 
all views presented were actually considered by the decisionmaker and whether the 
agency actually sought out the views of all those who might conceivably be interested in 
the proposed action. 
Achterman & Fairfax, supra note 6, at 528-29 (footnotes omitted). 
48. s. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 15, at 1042. 
49. Stewart, supra note 7, at 1760. 
50. A number of courts and commentators strongly believe in the validity of the assump-
tion. The District of Columbia Circuit, for example, has observed that "[i]n recent years, the 
concept that public participation in decisions which involve the public interest is not only 
valuable but indispensable has gained increasing support." For defenses of the principle of 
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of an "increasing congressional reliance on public involvement as an 
alternative to substantive specificity in legislation."51 
In this respect, the FLPMA constitutes a significant departure 
from previous approaches to public lands management. Although 
earlier acts had provided for public participation,52 the BLM's tradi-
tion of professionalism had long led agency officials to underesti-
mate the value of that participation.53 In enacting the FLPMA, 
Congress sought to correct this perceived deficiency in the adminis-
trative process. References to public participation occur throughout 
the statute, but the most important provisions are sections 202(a) and 
309(e).54 Section 202(a) directs the agency to involve the public in 
planning for public lands use; section 309(e) mandates public in-
volvement in the actual implementation of plans and programs. 
Read together, sections 202(a) and 309(e) call for ''the broadest pos-
sible participation in every decision. . . . Congress seemingly wants 
interest group representation in agency adjudication, see, e.g., J. SAX, supra note 16; Asimow, 
Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements, 15 MICH, L. 
REv. 520, 573-75 (1977); Bonfield, Representation far the Poor in Federal Rulemaking, 61 MICH. 
L. REv. 511, 511-12 (1969); Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participa• 
lion in the Administrative Process, 60 GEo. LJ. 525, 527-30 (1972); Gellhom, supra note 21, at 
361; Lazarus & Onek, The Regulators and the People, 51 VA. L. REv. 1069, 1092-94 (1971); 
McLachlan, .Democratizing the Administrative Process: Toward Increased Responsiveness, 13 
ARI.z. L. REv. 835, 851 (1971). But others have pointed out that the assumptions underlying 
the citizen participation movement have not been carefully scrutinized. See Achterman & 
Fairfax, supra note 6, at 507 (''Numerous unexamined assumptions were repeated so fre-
quently that they became incantations, and took on the mantle of revealed truth." (footnote 
omitted)); Wengert, Citizen Participation: Practice in Search of a Theory, 16 NAT. REsOURCES 
J. 23, 24 (1976). It is not clear that increased public participation will actually improve the 
quality of agency decisions, see Achterman & Fairfax, supra note 6, at 508; Stewart, supra note 
7, at 1776-81; Yellin, High Technology and the Courts: Nuclear Power and the Need far Institu-
tional Reform, 94 HARV. L. REv. 489, 546-49, 552-53 (1981), and the interest representation 
model may impose real costs, see Stewart, supra note 7, at 1770-76, 1789, particularly in the 
area ofland use planning, see Achterman & Fairfax, supra note 6, at 529-30 (suggesting that 
the adversarial model is inappropriate in this context, that courts will tend to overprocedural-
ize administrative decisionmaking, and that traditional interest representation concepts devel-
oped in civil rights litigation do iiot apply to land use planning because of demographic 
factors). For a case study of the shortcomings of expanding interest representation, see Com-
ment, Representation of the Public Interest in Michigan Utility Rate Proceedings, 10 MICH. L. 
REV. 1367 (1972). 
51. Achterman & Fairfax, supra note 6, at 508. 
52. See, e.g., Classification and Multiple Use Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-607, § 1, 78 Stat. 
986 (1964) (requires the Secretary of the Interior to hold public hearings on regulations to 
retain or dispose of the public lands); Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, ch. 865, § 18, 48 Stat. 1269 
(1934), as amended by Act of July 14, 1939, ch. 270, 53 Stat. 1002 (1939) (codified at 43 U.S.C. 
§ 3150-01 (1976)) (requires appointment of advisory boards oflocal stockmen in each grazing 
district). The FLPMA has not eliminated the opportunity for public participation provided by 
advisory bodies. In its original form FLPMA authorized the establishment of advisory coun-
cils by the Secretary of the Interior. Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976) (current version 
at 43 U.S.C. § 1739(a) (Supp. II 1978)). In 1978 Congress amended this section of FLPMA to 
make the establishment of citizen advisory councils mandatory. Act of Oct. 25, 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 95-514, 92 Stat. 1808 (1978) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1739(a) (Supp. II 1978)). 
53. Achterman & Fairfax, supra note 6, at 506-07; see H. KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER 
(1960). 
54. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712(a), 1739(e) (1976). 
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the BLM to use all conceivable techniques necessary to obtain the 
public's views in a particular instance."55 
Despite this mandate, Congress "has failed to set clear standards 
about the nature of participation envisioned or its place in public 
decision making."56 Its definition of "public involvement" is quite 
broad, 57 and leaves many pressing questions unanswered. It is clear, 
for example, that the public has a right to participate in ongoing 
agency proceedings, but the scope of that participation has been left 
for determination by the BLM and the courts. The agency is, of 
course, primarily responsible for giving content to Congress' vague 
mandate. "The courts' role," Professor Stewart has observed, "is 
limited to evaluating the adequacy of the agency's consideration of 
affected interests in the light of the statutory scheme and the particu-
lar facts."58 In reviewing the adequacy of the procedures leading to a 
particular agency decision, however, courts should remember that 
Congress appears to have required the BLM to "aggressively seek 
out the opinions of the public."59 Similarly, since "Congress has ex-
plicitly required that the BLM transcend AP A and other traditional 
consultation formats,"60 courts need not feel that Vermont Yankee 
precludes judicial imposition of procedures designed to elicit more 
meaningful public participation.61 
A more difficult question is whether the FLPMA's public partici-
pation provisions should be read to allow members of the public to 
initiate the formal planning process. Although the Act mandates the 
development of land use plans, it "sets virtually no priorities for 
agency action."62 Congress clearly did not envision that the BLM 
would contemporaneously begin to formulate site-specific manage-
55. Achterman & Fairfax, supra note 6, at 503, 518. 
56. Id at S03. 
57. The FLPMA defines ''public involvement" as: 
the opportunity for participation by affected citizens in rulemaking, decisionmaking and 
planning with respect to tlie public lands, including public meetings or hearings held at 
locations near the affected lands, or advisory mechanisms, or such other procedures as 
may be necessary to provide public comment in a particular instance. 
43 U.S.C. § 1702(d) (1976); see note 6 supra. 
The legislative history reveals that the Department of the Interior objected to public parti~ 
ipation in the actual management of the public lands. H.R. REP., No. 1163, supra note 6, at 48-
49, 53, (1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6222-23, 6227. Congress retained this directive 
over the Department's objection. 
The rejection of the Department's views suggests that Congress had a radical objective; it 
wanted procedures to be established that would involve the public actively in formulating 
plans and implementing them through on-going management decisions. Unfortunately, 
Congress did not indicate how this objective is to be achieved. 
Achterman & Fairfax, supra note 6, at 521. 
58. Stewart, supra note 7, at 1750. 
59. Achterman & Fairfax, supra note 6, at 512; see note 57 supra. 
60. Achterman & Fairfax, supra note 6, at 539. 
61. See text following note 32 supra. 
62. Achterman & Fairfax, supra note 6, at 509; see Diver, supra note 10, at 424. 
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ment plans for all of the 350 million acres ofland that it controls. As 
a general rule, a policymaker, to be effective, "must set his own 
agenda, based on :fixed social goals, and not rely on the roulette 
wheel of private initiative."63 But where the BLM fails to initiate 
proceedings to resolve a land use conflict that has been brought to its 
attention, it may undermine the adversarial decisionmaking process 
that Congress intended to promote by enacting the FLPMA. 64 Be-
cause that process, almost by definition; is likely to work effectively 
only where there are conflicting groups of incompatible users, the 
BLM should place a high priority on resolving existing conflicts 
through the formal planning process. 65 
Failure to recognize a right to initiate agency proceedings, more-
over, could vitiate the Act's public participation provisions. "The 
right to participate in formal agency proceedings or to seek judicial 
review of agency orders," Professor Stewart has observed, "is of little 
consequence if the agency develops policy or disposes of controver-
sies by informal processes to which these rights do not attach."66 As 
a result, some courts have begun to abandon their traditional reluc-
tance to require that formal proceedings replace informal policy 
decisions. 67 
In Environmental .Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus,68 for exam-
ple, the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Secretary of Agri-
culture's failure to initiate formal proceedings to suspend the 
registration of the pesticide DDT under the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. The Secretary's contention that the 
suspension issue was still under consideration was found to be un-
persuasive. Although the statute committed the issue to the Secre-
tary's discretion, the court held that the Act's public participation 
provisions imposed a duty on the Secretary to initiate the adminis-
63. Diver, supra note 10, at 419. 
64. The process is adversarial in that the BLM sits as a neutral arbiter of the positions 
articulated through the public participation procedures of FLPMA. "Moreover, the public 
involvement requirements invite and require the agencies to become brokers among compet-
ing political interests, rather than professional managers efficiently achieving social goals ex-
pressed through the representative mechanism of Congress." Achterman & Fairfax, supra note 
6, at 509. 
65. This does not mean that the BLM must immediately undertake to resolve every conflict 
that is brought to its attention. Resource limitations and the press of time could, given such a 
requirement, force the BLM to resolve petty disputes that do not affect the future productivity 
of the parcel of land at issue and to disregard other, more important, problems that do not 
happen to involve a conflict among current users. But the BLM should be forced to justify its 
ordering of priorities in some manner. 
66. Stewart, supra note 7, at 1752; see Green, Safety Determinations in Nuclear Power Li-
censing: A Critical Plew, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 633, 642 (1968); Jaffe, The Individual Righi lo 
Initiate Administrative Process, 25 low A L. REv. 485 (1940). 
67. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 
1971); Medical Co=. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated 
as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972); Stewart, supra note 7, at 1752-56. 
68. 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
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trative process whenever substantial questions about a pesticide's 
safety arise: 
[W]hen Congress creates a procedure that gives the public a role in 
deciding important questions of public policy, that procedure may not 
be lightly sidestepped by administrators . . . . The statutory scheme 
contemplates that these questions will be explored in the full light of a 
public hearing and not resolved behind the closed doors of the Secre-
tary. There may well be countervailing factors that would justify an 
administrative decision, after committee consideration and a public 
he~g, to continue a registration despite a substantial degree of risk, 
but those factors cannot justify a refusal to issue the notices that trigger 
the administrative process. 69 
Similarly, the FLPMA's comprehensive mandate to involve the pub-
lic in land use planning and management will fail if the BLM can 
sidestep the statutory planning process and ignore private parties' 
requests for initiation of formal proceedings. 
The lack of an explicit congressional authorization for citizen ini-
tiation of formal proceedings is more than a mere theoretical gap in 
the Act. In several contexts, the BLM's failure to initiate the admin-
istrative process contemplated by the FLPMA will result in the de 
facto allocation of the public lands to certain private interests. Con-
flicts among recreational users of the public lands, Part II points out, 
are particularly likely to be resolved in this manner. While the 
BLM's inaction should not, as a rule, be taken to evince an allocative 
choice, interpreting inaction as action seems justified under certain 
circumstances. When the agency ignores a significant conflict among 
users that has been brought to its attention, it ratifies the de facto 
allocation that has already occurred. Because these allocative deci-
sions are made without the benefit of the statutorily mandated public 
participation, they violate both the letter and the spirit of the Act. 
The argument for a judicially enforceable right to force the 
BLM's agenda by initiating the planning process thus proceeds in 
two directions. First, by acquiescing in a de facto allocative solution 
to a significant conflict among users that has been brought to its at-
tention in a request for formal proceedings, the BLM has actually 
made a planning decision that violates the Act. Alternatively, while 
the BLM's acquiescence does not itself constitute·an allocative deci-
sion in violation of the Act, the participation rights granted by Con-
gress can be effectuated only by forcing the agency to initiate formal 
proceedings. Ultimately, both arguments assume that certain users 
will win out over others if the competition among users is not regu-
lated and that the mix of uses achieved through this competitive pro-
cess may not be fully consistent with Congress' intent in the 
69. 439 F.2d at 594--95 (footnotes omitted). 
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FLPMA. Part II attempts to justify these assumptions by considering 
in depth one type of competition among users of the public lands. 
In considering that example, one should keep in mind that the 
agenda-forcing judicial role advocated in this Note need not be con-
sidered the product of recent judicial activism. One can find a corol-
lary to this role in the common-law public trust doctrine, 70 which 
analogizes the resource managers' duties to those of a fiduciary.71 
70. The public trust doctrine is a collection of common-law principles related to govern-
mental ownership of natural resources. These principles articulate governmental responsibil-
ity for ownership of certain types of resources in terms of "trust" responsibilities. This 
formulation of governmental responsibilties emphasizes ''the necessity for procedural correct-
ness and substantive care." W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 172 (1977). 
The public trust doctrine developed out of Roman law principles concerning public rights 
to navigation and use of waterways owned by the sovereign. More recently, it has been used to 
articulate public rights in governmentally owned natural resources. Sax, The Public Trust .Doc-
trine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970), 
For a survey of the historical development of the public trust doctrine, see Stevens, The Public 
Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes tire People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C.D, 
L. REv. 195 (1980). 
The public trust doctrine "is no more - and no less - than a name courts give to their 
concerns about the insufficiencies of the democratic process." J. SAX, supra note 16, at 521. It 
serves as a means by which courts can democratize bureaucratic decisionmaking, spotlight 
important resource management issues, and, if necessary, remand them to legislative or ad-
ministrative bodies for reconsideration in light of the court's articulation of their "fiduciary" 
obligations. The concept of a "remand" to the legislative or to administrative bodies as an 
appropriate remedy in natural resource litigation is developed in J. SAX, supra note 16: 
Here one reaches the central point about environmental litigation: the role of the courts is 
not to make public policy, but to help assure that public policy is made by the appropriate 
entity, rationally and in accord with the aspirations of the democratic process. 
The job of courts" is to raise important policy questions in a context where they can be 
given the attention they deserve and to restrain essentially irrevocable decisions until 
those policy questions can be adequately resolved. 
71. Wilkinson, Tire Public Trust .Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 269 
(1980). Courts and, especially, commentators have debated whether the public trust doctrine 
"applies" to the public lands. See Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980); 
Sierra Club v. Department of Interior (Redwoods III), 424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1976); 
Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Sierra Club v. 
Department of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974); W. RODGERS, supra note 70, at 173 
(advocating its application to all public lands); Montgomery, The Public Trust .Doctrine in Pub-
lic Land Law: Its Application in tire Judicial Review oJ Land C/ass!fication .Decisions, 8 WIL• 
LAMETTE LJ. 135 (1972) (concludes it is not yet applicable to public lands); Note, Proprietary 
.Duties of tire Federal Government Under tire Public Land Tl"IISI, 15 MICH. L. REv. 586 (1977) 
(argues in favor of applying ''public land trust" to public lands). As a coherent doctrine, this 
formulation of governmental responsibilities for public resources developed first in water law. 
See Sax,supra note 70, at 475-78; Stevens,supra note 70. Courts have extended its application 
to other public resources, such as the foreshore, see, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251,491 
P.2d 374, 98 Cal Rptr. 790 (1971); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 
61 NJ. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972), and some commentators have suggested that it "applies" to 
all public resources. 
[I]t has been said that state and federal governments serve as ''public guardian(s] of those 
valuable natural resources which are not capable of self-regeneration and for which sub-
stitutes can not be made by man." Perhaps trust protection requires identification of a 
resource whose natural and primary uses are public in nature and for which there is a 
public need. It takes no great inferential leap to conclude that public trust protection 
ought to be extended to all air, water, and land resources, the preservation of which is 
important to society. 
W. RODGERS, supra note 70, at 173 (footnotes omitted). The public trust doctrine analogizes 
the resource manager's duties to those of a fiduciary in private trust law. It serves as a means 
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The action-forcing character of this doctrine is striking;72 it demands 
a zealous commitment to manage public resources for the public 
good.73 Compliance with this standard requires foresight -the an-
by which courts can democratize bureaucratic decisionmaking, Sax, supra note 70, at 521, 
spotlight important resource management issues, and remand them, if necessary, to legislative 
or administrative bodies for reconsideration in light of their "fiduciary" obligations. See note 
70supra. 
So understood, the question of whether the public trust doctrine "applies" to the public 
lands misses the point. The issue is not whether private trust principles would find that the 
public lands were granted "in trust" for the benefit of the American people. Attempts to dis-
cover such a theory in century-old Supreme Court cases dealing with issues of federal power, 
not obligations, are not only attenuated, they are unnecessary. See Montgomery, supra; Note, 
supra (both expend a great deal of energy in analysis of old Supreme Court cases in an attempt 
to determine whether the public lands are held by the federal government "in trust" for the 
people as a precondition to application of the public trust doctrine). The appropriateness of 
the public trust doctrine's application in public lands law rests on contemporary understanding 
of the federal government's role as a land manager as articulated by Congress. The analysis 
requires scrutiny of the FLPMA to inquire into congressional will - the public trust doctrine 
serves as a coherent body of developed principles which, if found to correlate with congres-
sional will, offers a means of formulating administrative responsibilities. Its usefulness in this 
context is not diminished by the absence of the magic words of trust or of an explicit legislative 
adoption of the public trust doctrine. 
The real issue is whether the principles of fiduciary responsibility for public resources 
which has come to be labelled the "public trust doctrine" accurately reflects congressional 
intent in the realm of public lands management. And, if so, we must further inquire whether 
the manner in which the public trust doctrine formulates that intent assists judicial control of 
administrative discretion through the development of standards by which to judge site-specific 
management actions. This Note suggests that the public trust doctrine approximates congres-
sional intent with regard to the management of the public lands it is consistent with and fleshes 
out the procedural planning provision of FLPMA. In this regard it is crucial to note the shift 
toward a policy of public land retention and management to serve future needs. An analysis of 
the statutes working these changes reveals a congressional concern which is strikingly similar 
to the concerns of the public trust doctrine. The mechanistic approach to the issue of whether 
the public lands are held "in trust" has been rejected by Professor Wilkinson, who sets the 
analysis back onto the proper course: 
The modem statutes [governing the management of the public lands] are premised on the 
high station that today's society accords to the economic and environmental values of the 
federal lands and resources. They are rigorous laws designed to protect the public's inter-
est in the public's resources .... 
The whole of these laws is greater than the sum of its parts. The modem statutes set a 
tone, a context, a milieu. When read together they require a trustee's care. Thus we can 
expect courts today, like courts in earlier eras, to characterize Congress' modem legisla-
tive scheme as imposing a public trust on the public resources. 
The fact that the public trust doctrine in public land law must rest on implication 
should surprise no one. The doctrine has always rested on implication. 
Wilkinson, supra, at 299 (emphasis added). This Note further suggests that, as a practical 
matter, the manner in which this doctrine defines administrative responsibilities can assist 
courts in developing standards applicable to review of specific land management decisions 
within the framework of FLPMA. 
72. See Sierra Club v. Department of Interior (Redwoods II), 398 F. Supp. 284, 293-94 
(N.D. Cal. 1975) (court using public trust doctrine and National Park Service Act orders 
Secretary to exercise his legal authority to protect Redwoods National Park from harm result-
ing from logging on adjacent lands - order includes, if necessary, the Secretary's seeking of 
sufficient funds to protect the park); United Plainsmen Assn. v. North Dakota State Water 
Conservation Commn., 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976) (Supreme Court ofN.D. holds that state 
official's discretionary authority in water planning is circumscribed by the public trust doctrine 
which requires, at a minimum, that the officials determine the potential effects of water alloca-
tions on present and future needs of the state). Wilkinson, supra note 71, at 313-15. 
73. The agencies' duties as fiduciaries require a heightened sensitivity to possible conflicts 
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ticipation of threats to the resource before they actually occur - and 
a willingness to act quickly and effectively where the resource is 
threatened. Agency inaction in the face of threatened or actual harm 
to the resource violates trust obligations.74 Similarly, courts that al-
low citizens to force the BLM's agenda do no more than ensure that 
the agency zealously performs the duties imposed by section 202.75 
II. RECREATIONAL CONFLICTS ON PUBLIC LANDS 
As the popularity of the nation's public lands as sites for outdoor 
recreational activities has increased,76 conflicts between groups of 
over resource allocation and a willingness to act zealously to the full extent of their powers to 
address these problems. The manner in which this concept is translated into judicial review is 
illustrated by cases dealing with the Secretary of the Interior's responsibility for the manage-
ment of Indian reservations. 
These cases often articulate the Secretary's responsibility as being that of a fiduciary. See, 
eg., Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1971); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indi-
ans v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C 1973); Chambers, Judicial E'!forcement of the Federal 
Trust Responsibility lo Indians, 27 STAN L. REv. 1213 (1975). These responsibilities demand 
that he act with the ''utmost fairness" in protecting the Indians' interest, particularly where a 
dispute over Indian lands is involved. The Secretary must act zealously and to the full extent 
of his legal powers in advancing the Indians' interests - it is a breach of this duty for him to 
fail to take effective action in the face of threats to their lands. 
The Secretary . . . was further obliged to assert his statutory and contractual author-
ity to the fullest extent possible to accomplish [the preservation of the Indians' water 
rights] .... 
. . . Failure to take appropriate steps, under the circumstances, by the regulation con-
stitutes agency action unlawfully withheld and unreasonably delayed when viewed in the 
light of the Secretary's trust responsibilities to the tribe • • . . 
354 F. Supp. at 256-57. 
Similarly, in public land disputes agencies must act zealously and to the full extent of their 
legal powers to fulfill congressional objectives. Or, as the federal district court put it in Sierra 
Club v. Department of Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1976), to discharge their obliga-
tion, the responsible officials must have "gone as far as [they) legally or practically can go in an 
attempt to exercise [their] powers and perform [their] duties under existing law." 424 F. Supp. 
at 175 n.2. 
74. Wilkinson, supra note 71, at 313-15; see United Plainsmen Assn. v. North Dakota State 
Water Commn., 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976); cases cited in note 73 supra. 
75. See Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172, 175 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
The public trust doctrine recognizes the great public interest in the bureaucratic allocation 
of publicly owned resources. It merely attempts to balance the influence that private interest 
groups may have in the decisionmaking process. Fundamentally it is a mechanism by which 
the judiciary can ensure that the interests of the diffuse majority are adequately considered. 
See Sax, supra note 70, at 560. It is manifested in judicial skepticism toward administrative 
decisions that allocate public resources to the benefit of small private groups. Id at 484-85. A 
similar concern is expressed in the procedural provisions of the FLPMA. In that statute, Con-
gress has attempted to equalize access to the decisionmaking process by creating a surrogate 
legislative process with broad public input. See text at notes 33-40 supra. 
76. Recreational use of the national forests increased 37% between 1970 and 1980. FOREST 
SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, THE 1980 REl'oRT TO TIIE CONGRESS ON TIIE NA• 
TION'S RENEWABLE REsoURCES 29 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 REPORT]; see OUTDOOR 
RECREATION REsOURCES REVIEW COMMISSION, STUDY REP. No. 22, TRENDS IN AMERICAN 
LIVING AND OumooR RECREATION (1962); Haskell, Land Use and the Environment: Public 
Policy Issues, 5 ENVT. REP. (BNA) Monograph No. 20, at 6 (1974) (predicts fourfold increase 
in overall participation in major outdoor summertime activities between 1965 and 2000); H.R. 
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users seeking to recreate on the same tracts have become a major 
problem for public lands management.77 Most of these conflicts pit 
motorized against nonmotorized activities:78 Off-road vehicles, for 
example, compete with hikers for the California desert;79 power boat 
enthusiasts allegedly interfere with canoeists' enjoyment of the 
Boundary Waters Canoe Area;80 and snowmobilers vie with cross-
country skiers for winter in the North Woods.81 Underlying these 
controversies are the different, and often incompatible, perspectives 
that motorized and nonmotorized recreatioajsts bring to the public 
lands.82 
REP. No. 1551, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 
2377, 2381 (Letter from E.L. Petersen, Acting Secretary, Department of Agriculture, to Sam 
Rayburn, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives accompanying draft bill of the Multiple-Use 
Sustained-Yield Act of 1960): 
Many millions of people seek the national forests each year for rest, relaxation, and 
spiritual uplift. Recreationwise, the national forests are increasing in importance because 
of more leisure time, greater mobility of the average family, increased accessibility of the 
national forests, and the relatively low cost of a national forest vacation. 
77. See, e.g., Warren,Forewordto D. SHERIDAN, OFF-ROAD VEHICLES ON PuBuc LANDS 
at iii (1979) (A report of the Council on Environmental Quality) ("[T)he Council on Environ-
mental Quality sees the off-road vehicle problem as one of the most serious public land use 
problems that we face."); COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT 
TO THE CONGRESS: CHANGES IN PuBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE CON-
GRESSIONAL EXPECTATIONS 45-58 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as GAO REPORT]; 1980 RE-
PORT, supra note 76, at 29-30. 
78. This is not, however, always the case. There has been a heated battle between canoe-
ists and trout-fishermen for several of Michigan's most popular rivers. 
During the past several years, certain streams in the State, particularly the Au Sable 
river system, and to a lesser degree, the Pine, Pere Marquette and Manistee Rivers have 
become the locale of a highly controversial battle over compatible uses between fishermen 
and canoeists. 
Letter from Director of the Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources to the Michigan Attorney 
General (Aug. 2, 1971) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
Attempts to reconcile this conflict through the "zoning" of these rivers for canoe and fish-
ing use resulted in a Michigan Supreme Court decision. Westervelt v. Natural Resources 
Commn., 402 Mich. 412, 263 N.W.2d 564 (1978). 
19. See, e.g., D. SHERIDAN, supra note 77; Steinhart, Driving Out the Desert, AUDUBON, 
Nov. 1980, at 82-86; BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR FINAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT AND PROPOSED PLAN: CALIFORNIA DESERT CONSER-
VATION AREA E-89-90 (1980). 
80. See Rudd, Canoe Country Recreation,NATURALIST, Winter 1977, inside cover (Letter 
from the Editor); Lime, Wizen the Wilderness Gets Crowded, NATURALIST, Winter 1977, at 2. 
A similar type of conflict occurring between fishermen and water skiers has been identified 
by researchers. See Gramann & Burdge, The Effect of Recreation Goals on Co,iflict Perception: 
The Case of Water Skiers and Fishermen, 13 J. LEISURE RESEARCH 15 (1981). 
81. See Knopp & Tyger, A Study of Co,ifiict in Recreational Land Use: Snowmobiling v. 
Ski-Touring, 5 J. LEISURE RESEARCH 6 (1973). 
82. In the conflict between motorized and nonmotorized recreationists, both sides invoke 
what they feel are their fundamental rights. Nonmotorized recreationists, especially the 
ones who seek peace and quiet, demand freedom.from these machines while motorized 
recreationists demand a place to enjoy their machines. 
The nature of the ORV experience seems to be less contemplative, less aesthetic and 
more gregarious, more visceral, although ORVers appear to share with hikers and other 
non-motorized recreationists a desire to get away from confining jobs and • . . into wil-
derness and open spaces. 
1320 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 80:1303 
Not unexpectedly, perhaps, the failure of the BLM and other re-
sponsible agencies adequately to resolve these conflicts often results 
in a de facto allocative decision.83 At some point, of course, in-
creased numbers of users unacceptably degrade the quality of the 
recreational experience for all users. 84 There is, nevertheless, an ine-
quality of competition between motorized and nonmotorized recrea-
tionists because nonmotorized users tend to be more sensitive to 
crowding and to the visual and audio disturbances that accompany 
motorized activity.85 Unregulated use can so degrade the recrea-
D. SHERIDAN, supra note 77, at v. 4; see J. SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS: REFLEC· 
TIONS ON THE NATIONAL PARKS 27-59 (1980) (discussing the ''symbolic importance [of) the 
way people relate to nature" in their recreational activities in the context of National Park 
management. Id. at 51 (emphasis in original)). 
83. See GAO REPORT, supra note 77, at 45-50; D. SHERIDAN, supra note 77; Rosenberg, 
Regulation oJO.ff-Road Vehicles, 5 ENVT. AFF. 175 199-200 (1976); Steinhart, supra note 79, at 
82. 
84. There is an abundant literature both scientific and otherwise on the effects which in-
creased recreational use has on the enjoyment of recreational activities. See, e.g., R. NASH, 
WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 235 (1967) ("Having made such remarkable gains 
• . . in the last century, wild country could well be loved out of existence in the next. The 
problem, as preservationists are beginning to recognize, is that wilderness values are so fragile 
that when subjected to heavy recreational usage they dis11ppear.") Clawson, Economics and 
Environmental Impacts oJ Increasing Leisure Activities, FUTURE ENVIRONMENTS OF NORTH 
AMERICA 257 (1966): 
The impact upon the psychic environment may be as great or greater [than physical im-
pacts of increased recreational use]. A substantial portion of all present outdoor recrea-
tion areas was established because those areas offered a certain type of privacy, solitude, 
or naturalness. This has been lost in all too many cases; the popularity of the area de-
stroyed the qualities that led originally to its establishment. 
Several social scientists have adopted the concept of "carrying capacity" from the biologi-
cal sciences in seeking to describe the upper limits of recreational use on certain tracts before 
the recreational use of all users is unacceptably degraded. See, e.g., Lime, Principles oJ Recrea-
tional Carrying Capacity, in U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOUTHERN 
STATES RECREATION RESEARCH APPLICATIONS WORKSHOP 122 (General Technical Rep. No. 
SE-9, 1975); Heberlein, .Density, Crowding, and Satisfaction: Sociological Studies far .Determin-
ing Carrying Capacities, in FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, PROCEEDINGS: 
RlvER RECREATION MANAGEMENT AND RESEARCH SYMPOSIUM 67 (General Technical Rep. 
No. NC-28, 1977). It has been suggested that this concept can be translated into legal controls 
on the numbers of recreational users. Kuser, Carrying Capacity Controls far .Recreation Water 
l/ses, 1973 WIS. L. REV. l. 
85. St. Francis of Assissi himself while driving an ORV on wild land could not avoid 
diminishing the recreational experience of many non-ORVers in the same area ...• 
. . . "Silence is a resource. These sounds which man typically associates with the pris-
tine natural environment are perceived by the senses as solitude. The solitude of the 
desert is one of its .•. valuable resources .... " Direct encounters with ORV machines 
simply are not compatible with the quality of outdoor experience being sought by a ma-
jority of Americans. 
D. SHERIDAN, supra note 77, at 30-31 (footnote omitted). 
The fundamental problem is that recreationists have many different, and often conflicting, 
motives for engaging in outdoor recreation; these range from an aesthetic-religious desire for 
communion with nature, to "exit-civilization" motives, to th\: desire to gain a sensation of 
power and dominance over the physical environment. The preeminent analysis of the differ-
ing motives of Americans in seeking outdoor recreational experiences remains THE WILDLAND 
RESEARCH CENTER, WILDERNESS AND RECREATION • A REPORT ON RESOURCES, VALUES 
AND PROBLEMS (Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Comm. Study Rep. No. 3, 1962). A 
more ideological view of the differences can be found in J, SAX, supra note 82. 
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tional experience for non.motorized groups that they must either seek 
alternative sites or forgo their favorite activities.86 Failure to allocate 
the available public lands among competing recreational users, 
therefore, reduces the supply of land available for less intensive, 
non.motorized activities.87 This problem is most acute on lands lo-
Perhaps analyses of recreation so far have insufficiently distinguished between those 
activities that tum on conquest, with inescapable winners and losers, and those that have 
the capacity to transcend mastery. While there are many important similarities - such as 
complexity, challenge, independence, and skill development - there seem also to be im-
portant differences, not unlike the difference noted earlier between motorcycling and fly-
fishing. 
Id at 59 (footnote omitted). See also A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCH-
ES HERE AND THERE 194 (American Museum of Natural History ed. 1968) ("Recreation is 
valuable in proportion to the intensity of its experiences and to the degree to which it differs 
from and contrasts with workaday life." (emphasis in original)). 
From this ideological perspective, the management of public lands for recreational uses 
becomes part of a much larger social agenda. , 
These observations are a warning to recreational idealists, implying that no effort to 
encourage more challenging and "disturbing" leisure activity can hope to succeed unless 
and until the workplace is reformed. The idea is that we observe in present recreational 
choices a reflection of profound needs that no mere change of attitude or public J>Olicy can 
affect: that those who already have power in the society (like successful professionals) are 
attracted to recreation that demonstrates to them that they are above needing power; 
while those who are powerless need nothing so much as to demonstrate (however piti-
fully) that they are capable of dominion. Thus the distinguished New York lawyer and 
fly-fisherman lies by the side of a stream contemplating the bubbles, while the factory 
worker roars across the California desert on a motorcycle. 
J. SAX, supra note 82, at 48. 
This Note abjures any ideological judgments concerning the social or individual value of 
recreational choices. Rather, it advocates management to assure an equitable opportunity for 
all types of recreational activities on the public lands. It suggests that this is the result Con-
gress intended from FLPMA's adversarial public participation procedures. 
86. Generally, the noisier, more consumptive, and uncontemplative recreation activities, 
such as ORV riding, preempt and drive out the activities that are quieter, less consump-
tive, and more contemplative . . . . 
D. SHERIDAN, supra note 77, at 32. 
[O]ne ORV operator can effectively restrict a large public area to his own use through the 
emission of loud engine noise, obnoxious smoke, gas and oil odors and dangerously high 
speeds. Whereas previously many persons of all ages and wealth could observe the beauty 
of unspoiled land, now a single ORV can reign supreme. 
Rosenberg, supra note 83, at 176. 
87. See, e.g., D. SHERIDAN, supra note 77, at 33-34: 
In effect, ORVs shrink the amount ofland available for non-ORV recreationists .... 
In this regard, ORVs could not have come at a more inop]>ortune time. Recreational 
land is an increasingly scarce resource. The supply is dwindling in absolute terms - as 
the nation paves over land for roads, housing, parking lots, shopping centers, and other 
urban developments at the rate of more than 1 million acres per year - and in relative 
terms because of the great upsurge in outdoor recreational demand. In other words, ORVs 
are making a scarce resource even scarcer far the growing number of non-ORV 
recreationists. 
(emphasis added). See also Steinhart, supra note 79, at 85: 
[ORV use] also causes declines in the number of human visitors. According to BLM 
figures, only 15 percent of the visitors came to the desert primarily to use vehicles .... 
But motorcycle and dune buggy noise and violence drive the others out. Says a bureau 
planner, ''The two groups cannot coexist, and don't. One set of recreationists will actually 
drive off another set and take over." Opinion polls show that more than a third of desert 
visitors object to motorcycles and dune buggies. And because off-road vehicles drive the 
others out, ORV drivers rarely see competing users and believe that they are the majority 
of desert visitors. 
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cated near large urban areas. 88 
Given the ferocity of many of the existing conflicts among recrea-
tional users, 89 it is safe to assume that public land managers are 
aware of the problem.90 The agencies' inability or unwillingness to 
resolve these conflicts by initiating the statutory planning process 
may be traced to several factors. It is possible, for example, that the 
land managers simply do not recognize conflicts among users of the 
public lands as a problem that they must resolve; they may instead 
concentrate their efforts on preventing the physical degradation of 
the lands. A more likely explanation, however, is that agency offi-
cials fear the political ramifications of regulating competing users. 
Groups of users have, in recent years, become quite well organized. 
The groups whose a~tivities require the greatest expenditure of 
money tend to be supported by strong commercial interests and have 
been very effective in preventing agency regulation of recreational 
88. The relationship between distance and frequency of recreational use has been charac-
terized as a "distance-decay function" by a former BLM director. M. CLA wsoN, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT 30 (1976) (emphasis added): 
For all kinds of outdoor recreation areas, a distance-decay function is strongly opera• 
tive; that is, the proportion of people visiting an area, ~d the frequency of their visits, 
declines rapidly as distance from the area increases. Most city parks draw their visitors 
from a radius of a very few miles, most all-day outing areas draw their visitors from less 
than 100 miles, and it seems probable that the overwhelming majoril)' of the visitors lo na• 
tionalfarests live within JOO miles of thefarest they visit. This is not to deny that some 
visitors travel much farther, or that visitors on long trips do not stay overnight in national 
forests, but it is clear that most visitors live closer. . . . To this extent, the benefits of 
national fares/ outdoor recreation are more regional or local and less national, than are the 
benefits of either their wood or their farage production, since the consumer products from 
the latter two outputs move nationally more than does the recreation output. 
89. See, e.g., Steinhart, supra note 79. 
90. See D. SHERIDAN, supra note 77; GAO REPORT, supra note 77, at 49-50. In fact, the 
recreation conflict in the California desert was partly responsible for the special treatment 
given the California Desert Conservation Area by FLPMA. 43 U.S.C. l 78(a)-G) (1976). Sec-
tion 178(a)(4) provides: 
[T]he use of all California desert resources can and should be provided for in a multiple 
use and sustained yield management plant to conserve these resources for future genera-
tions, and to provide present and future use and enjoyment, particularly outdoor recrea-
tion uses, including the use, where appropriate, of off-road recreational vehicles. . . . 
43 U.S.C. §§ 178(a)(4) (1976). 
The findings listed in Sec. 401(a) outline the necessity of a multiple-use plan for the 
California Desert Conservation Area. When the plan is being developed, the Secretary of 
the Interior should keep in mind that there are many users of the desert resources, some of 
whom have ideas which are in direct conflict with those held by other users. One of the 
most critical and immediate areas of public disagreement is in the matter of off-road vehi-
cle (ORV) activities. . . . There is a widening breach between those citizens who favor 
more ORV restriction and those who favor less. The California Desert Conservation 
Area Advisory Committee located in Section 40l(g) can play a key role in bringing these 
two important groups together as part of its work in helping to develop the final compre-
hensive, long-range plan for the protection, use and manag\:ment of the natural resource 
lands within the California desert. 
H.R. REP. No. 1163, supra note 6, at 229-30 (Supplemental Views of Rep. Pettis), reprinted In 
STAFF OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL REsOURCES, 95TH CONG. 2D SESS., 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976, at 
431, 656-57 (Comm. Print 1978). 
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use.91 These groups' strength, moreover, has been enhanced by a 
long history of unregulated recreational use of the public lands, a 
tradition that allows opponents of regulation successfully to employ 
the rhetoric of excessive governmental interference with historic in-
dividual freedoms.92 In the face of this organized opposition to reg-
ulation, the land management agencies have on occasion yielded to 
the loudest voices and have not acted effectively.93 
By endorsing, in effect, the de facto allocative decisions that re-
sult from unregulated competition among recreational users, the 
BLM also biases future planning initiatives.94 If existing use pat-
terns are relied upon to project future recreational demand, the final 
allocation of the public lands to various recreational uses will be bi-
ased in favor of motorized and other space-intensive users. This de-
ficiency in recreational planning has been studied by BLM 
Recreational Planner Robert Badarracco, who labels it the "ISD 
syndrome:"95 
The irony of the ISD syndrome . . . is that administrators and manag-
ers tend to measure recreational demand on the basis of current partic-
91. See, e.g., Westervelt v. Natural Resources Commn., 402 Mich. 412, 263 N.W.2d 564 
(1978) (commercial canoe livery owners challenged Michigan Department of Natural Re-
sources' attempts to regulate canoe use on prime trout-fishing streams). The emphasis on 
physical impacts in the debate over certain uses of public lands is often a politically more 
palatable way of dealing with the problem of conflicting user groups. 
[The preservationist's] vocabulary is principally directed to the land and to physical re-
sources, and when he objects to off-road vehicle use or to plans for an urban-style resort in 
the mountains, his complaint is routinely phrased in terms of adverse impacts on soil, 
water resources, or wildlife. These are certainly authentic concerns, but they are often 
viewed as a disingenuous, politically neutral way of objecting to the kind of recreation 
other people prefer. 
J. SAX, supra note 82, at 50. 
One commentator has criticized the California Desert Conservation Area Management 
Plan in this regard, noting that the plan allows motor vehicles in approximately 80% of the 
desert. Steinhart, supra note 79, at 84. See also, Comment, Protecting the Public Lands: BLM 
Stuck in Low Gear On Regulating Use of Off-Road Vehicles, 8 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. 
INST.) 10,178 (1978). 
92. Some cyclists hold that they are, pure and simple, champions of individual liberty 
against government restraint, wheel-rut rebels carrying aloft the tattered banner of the 
independent man. . . . BLM has fallen for the line. 
Steinhart, supra note 79, at 86. 
93. The bureau's [BLM's] half-heartedness about enforcing rules can be explained by its 
history of trying to please clients before defending resources. It allowed off-roaders to 
establish a habit of free use of the desert, and now is unable to break that habit. 
Id. at 85; see Comment, supra note 91. 
94. The need for good data upon which to base management planning was recognized by 
Congress in its provisions for inventories of the public land resources. The acquisition and 
proper use of data underlies the entire land management planning process. ''The need for 
good data is greatest when resource conflicts are being identified and mitigated and when 
initial land use and natural resource allocations are being made. Inadequate data increases the 
potential for making poor allocations which are difficult or impossible to reverse." GAO RE-
PORT, supra note 77, at 38-39. 
95. "ISD" stands for the Impairment of user satisfaction (because of differential sensitivity 
to conflicts), the Suppression of the more sensitive uses, and the eventual Displacement of 
those uses through planning techniques that rely on existing use patterns. 
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ipation rates . If a resource supervisor sees a given recreational 
activity prevailing at a certain site, he interprets this as a reflection of 
public demand .... If the site he observes is used to capacity, he may 
plan additional sites or programs for the same purpose, even though 
the previous users have been displaced. Thus the administrator may 
allocate additional opportunities to a group which has suppressed or 
displaced a former traditional group. In eff(?ct, the administrator, per-
haps unwittingly, assists in the suppression and displacement of addi-
tional traditional users. Enough managers following the same course 
could well set into motion recreational evolutionary processes which 
change the character of outdoor recreation despite the intense feelings 
of a broader public.96 
At least one court has recognized the powerful distorting effect of the 
status quo on future land management planning. In National Wild-
life Federation v. Morton ,91 the court pointed to the creation of an 
"inertial presumption in favor of ORV use" to justify its reversal of a 
BLM directive that classified all BLM lands as open to ORV use 
pending a study of those lands to determine which should be re-
stricted to nonmotorized activities.98 
The BLM's policy of open access management is seriously under-
mining its ability to achieve the future-oriented goals established by 
Congress in the FLPMA.99 By allowing citizens to place significant 
96. Quoted in D. SHERIDAN, supra note 77, at 32-33. 
97. 393 F. Supp. 1286 (D.D.C. 1975). 
98. (D]esignation as "open" [to ORV use] does not truly maintain the status quo. As 
plaintiff notes, this designation, being an official governmental act, changes the character 
of the land use policy, tilting itin favor of ORV use. Future designations will not be made 
in the context of applying the required criteria to decide whether specific areas and trails 
should be opened or closed to ORV use. Instead, authorized officers will be required to 
employ the criteria in determining whether a specific area or trail's existing "open" status 
should be changed to "closed" or "restricted." This distinction creates a subtle, but never-
theless real,mertialpresumption in favor of ORV use. 
393 F. Supp. at 1292. 
The court applied APA review of the BLM's compliance with Executive Order 11,644. By 
the preemptive classification of the study lands as "open" the BLM, according to the court, had 
undermined future public participation in the designation process - the decision to be made 
became the changing oflands classified as "open" to "closed" status - contrary to the Order. 
The BLM's subsequent response to this decision has been one which leaves most lands in 
undesignated status which, in effect, leaves them open to ORV use. The impermissible pre-
sumption no longer exists on paper, just in fact. 
[B]y essentially continuing the status quo, the [post-NWFv. Morion] regulations appear to 
be utterly unresponsive to the spirit or urgency concerning the prevention of continued 
deterioration of resources embodied in the Executive Order and the district court's opin-
ion. 
BLM has not aggressively and affirmatively addressed the environmental problem of 
ORV usage on its lands; rather, it has simply made a minimal response to the Executive 
Order and court decision with the apparent intent to protect as much as possible the recre-
ational interests of the ORV users. 
Comment, supra note 91, at 1018. 
99. It is widely accepted that demand for resource-based outdoor recreation will con-
tinue to rise. It follows that, by maintaining an open-access management policy, we will 
find that our ability to sustain the quality of user benefits is gradually diminishing. The 
outlook for the use of unique recreational resources therefore appears to be gloomy in-
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conflicts among recreational users on the BLM's planning agenda, 
courts make th~ ultimate effectuation of Congress' intent more cer-
tain. While the agency must retain substantiaf discretion over its 
agenda, courts should be willing to scrutinize its reasons for accord-
ing the resolution of particular recreational conflicts a low priority. 
If an adequate explanation is not forthcoming from the agency, 
courts should also feel free to order the agency to initiate the plan-
ning process to ensure that the rights of citizen participation guaran-
teed by Congress are not vitiated by de facto planning decisions. 100 
CONCLUSION 
In enacting the FLPMA, Congress attempted to substitute for 
substantive specificity by providing for broad public participation in 
the public lands management process. To vindicate those participa-
tion rights, this Note has argued, the courts must be prepared to rec-
ognize a limited right of citizens to initiate the statutory planning 
procedures. Particularly in the area of recreational conflicts, agency 
inaction may result in a de facto management decision that deprives 
some citizens of the use of the public lands without allowing them an 
opportunity to contribute to the decisionmaking process. Only by 
granting requests by citizens for formal proceedings can the BLM 
and the courts end this affront to Congress' intent. 
deed. Unless we institute such management policies as pri~ or administrative restrictions 
(including spatial and time use-redistribution schemes) to restrict visitors' inflow, benefits 
to future users will decline or disapppear altogether. 
FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, OUTDOOR RECREATION: ADVANCES IN AP-
PLICATION OF ECONOMICS 38 (General Technical Rep. No. WO-2, 1977). 
100. For an example of the type of judicial review of the BLM's recreational planning 
appropriate under the "action forcing" mandate, see Wilderness Public Rights Fund v. 
Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1979) (noncommercial river rafters' of the Grand Canyon 
challenge to the Secretary of the Interior's allocation of rafting permits between commercial 
and noncommerical rafters under, inter alia, the National Park Service Act). 
